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FIRM CREDITORS' PRIORITY ON PARTNERSHIP
PROPERTY.
INTRODUCTION.
One of the chief advantages of the common law over
a code is its flexibility. By reason of this it is possible, not
only in courts of law, but-if they fail-in the chancery, to
so modify rules of law that they may meet the needs of
changed conditions in the world of affairs. It is for this
reason that the study of English law in a historical light
has a special importance. One who reads the current de-
cisions is as a rule observing the fine flower-so to speak-
of a doctrine which has, perhaps, taken centuries to mature.
If he look at it from a twentieth century point of view it
may not appear to him of special excellence. But if he
take the trouble to pursue the records of its growth as con-
tained in the reports of past decisions-to find the germ
from which it sprang-he will probably come to the same
conclusion that Lord Coke did when he said that the com-
mon law-being the product of many minds working amidst
various conditions-far surpassed the possible wisdom of
any one man or. group of men, endeavoring to create a
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system of law out of hand. Accordingly the study of
ancient decisions has a special value in connection with the
modem law. It is interesting to see how, when the courts
of law had crystalized their decisions into inflexible rules
whose strict operation led to results unsatisfactory to the
community, the chancellor would introduce some modus
vivendi which would in effect repeal the law while express-
ing the greatest respect for it. Frequently this was done
by processes which from a strictly logical point of view were
like the proverbial hair-splitting. The result, however, was
the main consideration, and as the means employed were
often of an unsatisfactpry nature it was difficult for some
decisions to weather the storm of hostile criticism. Then
the dangerous but useful expedient of distinguishing be-
tween cases to the naked eye as like as possible was invoked.
Hence the confusion of some branches of the law and two
or more "lines" of cases descending from a common an-
cestor.
Bearing in mind, however, that the law is above all else
practical, and that where necessity takes the direction logic
must step aside, we are prepared to look tolerantly upon the
"elaborate structures of split hairs" raised by the common
lawyers. It sometimes happens also that the scaffolding-
to carry out the figure-used in erecting the "structure" is
never wholly removed, resulting in a disfigurement of the
edifice.
With. this general introduction we may take up a con-
sideration of a certain important branch of the law which
has given rise to endless ingenious discussion-namely, what
are the true principles upon which firm creditors may claim
priority upon partnership property in case of a contest be-
tween them and separate creditors of the partners.
Difficulty of the Subject.-The adventurous student who
sets forth on a voyage of discovery over the apparently
trackless ocean of decisions on the subject of priorities
of partnership creditors, over separate creditors of the
partners (as to firm property) soon finds himself in'angry
seas and driven hither and thither at the mercy of contrary
currents of decision.' If he look about him he will find as
See opinion of Henderson, J., 42 Ark at p. 450 (1883) and T. Par-
sons, P. S. p. 327.
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his only aid the bright star of Eldon's genius which points
a way of safety to the haven of understanding where he fain
would be. The following essay is an attempt to chart a
course over this apparently pathless sea.
Any one who, like thi author, has examined the two
hundred or more cases on this subject to be found in the
books, will be impressed with the great diversity of decis-
ions in the state courts. Not only do the cases conflict
among themselves, but many of them differ internally.
Various courts have taken almost every conceivable view
of the subject. Many of the reasons. adduced are, it
is believed, unsound. In some cases several reasons are
given as the bases of the same decision, notwithstanding
that upon close examination they appear to be inconsistent.
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It seems that the-reason for this unsatisfactory state of the
law is due to the conflict of interests which necessarily arises
in cases of this sort. There are two. main points of view
from which the subject may be regarded; that of the pur-
chaser of a partner's unascertained share and that of the
firm creditor. The corollaries of these respectively are
those of the separate creditor and of the partner himself.
These last two give a slightly different outlook. Conse-
quently. where there is so much uncertainty as to what the
law ought to be and, by reason of its involved nature, as to
what it really is, courts of different predilections have ar-
rived at different results.
It is believed that in the present state of the law no
theory however comprehensive can have at all its points
the authority of even a preponderance of decisions-unani-
mity is not to be thought of. The following thesis is, then, a
tentative effort to develop a coherent theory which will be
adequate to the needs of the subject.
Probable Historical Growth.-Certainly at common law
a partner might sell out his unascertained share or in-
terest in a partnership and it might also be sold out on
Consequenily in the preparation of this article the English decisions
-:-which are, admittedly or not, the source of the entire law on this.
subject-have been principally looked to.. In order to prevent "over-
loading" the notes only the decisions in point have been cited, and ele-
mentary propositions are stated without citations.
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execution by his separate creditor.3 The result seems to
have been that the separate creditor took the entiie proceeds
of the sale; the vendee took as tenant in common with the
remaining partner,4 free however from any liability to the
joint creditor, who thereby lost his right to come upon the
entire partnership estate and could only have execution upon
the moiety of the remaining partner.5 Apparently this
state of affairs was deemed intolerable, since about the
middle or early part of the eighteenth century the Chan-
cellor would in many cases relieve the joint creditor,6 not,
however, for his own merit, but in aid of the remaining
partner.7  Subsequently the relief was also allowed at law
by Lord Mansfield, though later this remedy was restored to
the court of chancery. It is impossible to give a more par-
ticular statement of the historical growth of the joint credi-
tor's priority." Even Lord Eldon, nearly a century ago,
confesses that "How it originally became law t do not
know."9
It may readily be imagined that it was thought expedient
that firm credit additional to that existing by the old law
as to partnerships should be given by allowing a firm creditor
a preference over an individual creditor.10 It will be re-
membered that the beginning of the eighteenth century was
a time when England's commerce was growing vigorously
and such favoring of firm transactions would be only an-
other manifestation of the growing consideration of the
'Pope v. Haman, Comberbach, p. 217 (1694), see also Watson, Part-
nership, chap. v.
'This is true now in some states, e. g., Knight v. Ogden, 2 Tenn. Ch.,
pp. 473 to 477 (187s) ; Andrews v. Keith, 34 Ala. 722' (i859) ; semble,
Hirschfield-y. Claflin, 52 Cal. 617 (1878). It is believed that the cases
in notes 58-68 inclusive are inexplicable on any other view.
'Theophilus Parsons, Partnership, chap. x; see also note on p. lo6,
I6 Johns. (N. Y.) (i8ig) and Morrison v. Blodgett, 8 N. H. 244 (1836).
Cf. Craven v. Widdowes, 2 Cas. Ch. 139 (1682).
' See Taylor v. Fields, 4 Ves. 396 (1799).
" Cf. Fox v. Hanbury, Cowper at p. 445 (1755).
'See, however, Jacky v. Butler, 2 Ld. Raym. at p. 871 (17Ol) and
authorities there cited.
'Barker v. Goodair, ii Ves. p. 78 (8o5).
"But see remarks of Gibson, C. J., in Doner v. Stauffer, i P. & W.
I98 (1829).
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common law for the convenience of merchants. The (prob-
ably nearly contemporaneous) statute III and IV Anne
(making promissory notes negotiable) is also an example
of this tendency, as is Lord Mansfield's later recognition of
the customs of merchants in insurance cases.
However this may have been the courts having once laid
down the rule that firm creditors might have priority
seemed to feel the necessity of some more conclusive reason
than the vague (and in this case disputed) one of "public
policy."
Nature of Joint Creditor's Priority.-Accordingly it was
early laid down11 and has been followed in a myriad of
cases12 that the priority of the joint creditor depended upon
the equity of the partner to have the firm property applied
to the payments of the firm debts.' 3
The strict logical operation of this principle, however,
appeared to some judges14 and writers to lead to harsh and
inequitable results. In consequence the: principle was either
neglected in certain cases or a new principle, namely, that
the joint creditor had in his own right a sort of a lien upon
the corpus of the firm estate ,ras advanced. Among the text
writers James Parsons, it seems,' 5 was the most vigorous
champion of this theory. He says :'1 "The firm creditor
enjoys a priority on the firm fund, not by reason of any dif-
ference between his contract with the parties and that of a
separate creditor, but by reason of an independent and
Story, Partnership, p. 558.
S. Bates, P. S., vol. ii, § 824 and authorities in note 2.
"Kent, Com. iii,* p. 65.
"E. g. in Tenney v..Johnson, 43 N. H. 144 (i86i).
' I say "it seems" advisedly since, notwithstanding the apparently
explicit statement in his book, he agrees with the tremendous weight
of authority that the right of the firm creditor to priority is dependent
upon the partner's "equity." But Mr. J. Parsons goes on to contend
that the partner's equity is an inalienable, indestructible interest. Con-
sequently if the foundation consisting of the partner's equity is inde-
structible the superstructure of the joint cieditor's priority would also
be indestructible. This then in effect amounts to a vested interest in
the firm creditor. It is obvious that the objections made by Lord Eldon
apply with equal force in both cases.
'Partnership, 2d ed., p. 453; see also p. 474.
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vested right which he has acquired in the firm stock in con-
sequence of its destination to his use by means of the joint
tenancy of the partners."
The inconvenience of the practical operation of this view
and its effect, if carried out, to destroy the very end--com-
mercial convenience-which it sought to serve, was long ago
pointed out by Lord Eldon in ex. p. Ruffin.17 Carried to its
logical conclusion it would result in the intolerable incon-
venience that no firm could ever give a clear title to a pur-
chaser of its property as long as there were creditors of the
firm.
Let us revert to the other view sanctioned by authority
and grounded in reason. s
"Partner's Equity."--Assuming then that the firm credi-
tor's priority i's dependent upon the so-called "partner's
equity" (which is also enforced at law), which enables the
partner to have the joint property applied to the payment of
the firm debts, it becomes important to consider (a) the
nature of the "partner's equity" and (b) the grounds upon
which it is based.
(a) Its Elements.-As to the nature of the partner's
equity it has been suggested that it consists of four ele-
ments: (I) to have the partnership assets applied to the
payment of the partnership debts; (2) the corresponding
right to demand contribution in case of a deficiency of assets;
(3) a right to a moiety of any surplus remaining;19 and,
(4) for the purpose of enforcing all the preceding rights,
an independent right to an accounting. It has been in-
geniously contended that when a partner sells out or has
sold out on execution "all his right, title and .interest" in
the firm only the last two rights pass to the sheriff's or part-
ner's vendee (since the vendee is not liable for the firm
176 Ves. I19 (i8oi). "To say this seems to me a monstrous proposi-
tion;-that which at any time during the partnership has been part of
the partnership effects, shall remain [so] notwithstanding a bona fide
act. . . . If it were held [so] . . . commercial transactions
could not go on at all." Quoted with approval by Church, C. J., in
Allen v.- Co., 21 Conn. 130 to 137 (181).
"Jones v. Fletcher, 42 Ark., at pp. 45o-51-52 (1883).
"By Lord Eldon in ex parte Williams, ii Ves. p. 3 (x8o5).
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debts, and therefore has no need to acquire the first two
rights); and the rights first mentioned still remain in the
partner. It is conceived that while the first right20 above
mentioned may not pass to the vendee yet it is, unless'
specially reserved,'- lost to, the retiring partner,22 which as
far as the joint creditor is concerned amounts to the same
thirig as if it had passed to the vendee. Even in the few
jurisdictions which insist that the first part of the equity
is unassignable by the retiring partner it is admitted that
it is a right which may be waived.23  In any event it is
difficult to see how a partner can sell out all his "right, title
and interest" and at the same time reserve a part of it by
implication.
(b) Its Nature and Foundations.-As to the grounds- on
which the partner's equity is based: A very recent view
enunciated by the Chief Justice of Maryland 24 is that, "Part-
nership creditors have no lien on partnership assets, but the
partners themselves have a right to ihsibt upon the appropri-
ation of the joint property to the payment of joint debts,
upon the principle that as the joint debts were contracted in
making the purchases of the Joint assets the latter ought
primarily to be charged with the burden of paying the
former.25 The right of the partners to have the joint debts
"As to the right to demand pro rata contribution from the remaining
partners this, it seems in all cases, remains to the retiring partner. So
far as I am aware no case has ever decided the point, probably for the
reason that in the cases where it might have arisen, it would have been
impossible to recover anything of value.
" As was the case in Buck Co. v. Johnson, 7 Lea (Tenn.), 282 (i88x);
Rogers v. Nichols, 2o Tex. 719 (I858); Darden v. Crosby, 3o Tex. z5O
(1867), and Wildes v. Chapman, 4 Edw. Ch. 669 (1846).
Tracy v. Walker, i Flip. (Circuit Court of U. S. for 0.) 41 to 44
(z86i).
I Cf. Baker's Ap. 21 Pa. p. 76 (1853), and Young v. Clapp, 32 N. E.
187 to 191 (x892), first col., and Howre v. Lawrence, 9 Cush. 553 to
558 (1852). Likewise where all partners agree to apply firm property
to satisfaction of separate debt of a partner.
"Franklin Sugar Ref. Co.-v. Henderson, 86 Md. 452 (1897).
'This "principle" seems rather curious. It has a certain speciousness
about it, but on examination it appears to be merely a hollow phrase.
Clearly the "debts" have no rights. Nor is there any duty on the part
of the assets to surrender themselves in satisfaction of the firm obliga-
tions. The debts are personal to the partners, and it would seem clear
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paid out of the joint assets in preference to the right of the
separate creditors to be paid out of the same assets, gives
rise to the derivative equity of the joint creditors to have
payment of their claims out of the proceeds of the co-part-
nership property before any of those proceeds can be de-
voted either to the separate use or appropriated to the pay-
ment of the separate debts, of any of the members of the
firm."
It has also been said that the partner's equity is an inci-
dent of his ownership in the firm business, in which case it
would seem to be dependent upon one of the terms of the
partnership agreement, express or implied,2 6 or upon some
arbitrary rule of law. That is to say that the right of a part-
ner to compel the appropriation of firm property to the satis-
faction of firm debts is a chose in action springing from the
contract of partnership, or a property right of a peculiar na-
ture. In considering the first point the remarks of Gibson,
C. J.,2 7 seem to leave nothing to be desired. "That a con-
tract which enables the parties to keep a class of their credi-
tors at bay and yet retain the indicia of ownership, should
not have been deemed within the statutes of [13] Elizabeth
[Chap. V, infra] is attributable exclusively to the disposition
universally manifested by courts of justice to encourage
trade." But it is believed that such an agreement would be
inherently unenforcable. The 'Tact that the courts allowed
a preference to joint creditors would therefore indicate that
they proceed upon some principle ab extra and in nowise
arising from the partner's contract.28
The second point, that the right of the partner to have
the firm property applied to the .payment of the firm debts,
is a sort of property right presents less difficulty. If we
regard it as property (in the nature of a -lien) and yet, as
that the personal 9tatus of the partners should be the basis of rights
and luties. But !e Kent, Com. iii,* p. 65, note i by Holmes, now C. J.
of Massachusp and Bates, P. S., vol. ii, § 82o, and Tenney v. $ohnson,
43 N. H. i,*, 16i) in this connection.
" See L'n , P. S. 6th ed. p. 338.
" r' ,"v :uaffer, i P. & W. 198 (1829).
on p ioint J. Parsons' acute-if involved and obscure--criti-
cis -i c C. ,;ibson's view.
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does James Parsons, inalienable and only extinguished upon
payment of the firm obligations, we are presented with the
unusual phenomenon of an untransferable right of property.
But this is no unknown conception in the common law.29 If,
however, we regard it as property which is untransferable,
yet we would admit that it might be capable of surrender
and we would probably go further, and say that it always
was surrendered-unless stipulated otherwise-so as to pass
an unencumbered title.
Still another view is that it springs from the partner's un-
limited liability for the reason that if one partner did not
have his "equity" another partner might appropriate the firm
assets to the payment of his private debts, whereupon the
other partner would have to make good the deficiency as to
the firm creditors, thus virtually, in case of insolvency by the
first partner, having to pay the debts of the bankrupt as well
as the firm obligations.30
It is submitted that these last two reasons are correct and
that with them in" mind it is possible to work out a rational
theory of the law in harmony with decided cases.
Practical Application of the Theory. When the Partner's
Equity is Gone, Joint Creditor's Priority is Gone--not Be-
fore.-We have seen above the four elements of the part-
ner's equity and two reasons which may be said to be its
foundation, and now proceed to a consideration of all pos-
sible cases in which the doctrine can operate as to firm credi-
tors.
Since in the last analysis, then, the joint creditor's priority
is a derivative right, it is a right in rem or quasi-lien 3' opera-
tive only through the. medium of a personal right belonging
to a partner.
3 2
Consequently when the partner's personal right is lost the
derivative right of the firm creditor is lost also.
" BI. bk. ii, ch. ii,* p. 35. The "spendthrift" trust would be another
illustration.
Cf. I Bates, Partnership, § 54o.
" See T. Parsons, Partnership, p. 331, note. Evidently it is not a true
lien, since it is not on any specific property. v. Young v. Clapp, 32 N. E.
187 to 19o Ist col. (892).
" Cf. J. Parsons; Partnership, 2d ed., pp. 5o8-11-12.
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No doubt there exists, as long as all the original partners
remain in the firm, a series of mutual equities akmong the
parties. 83
True it is that these equities are latent and only arise ex
proprio vigore, in such sort as to give rise to the derivative
right of.the joint creditor, upon a dissolution of the partner-
ship84 or in case of bankruptcy.3 5 In the language of Lord
Eldon,38 "While they remain solvent and the partnership
is going on the joint creditor has no equity against the
effects of the partnership."
Suppose A., B. and C. partners. Obviously A. has equities
against B. and C. B. has equities against A. and C. C.
has equities against A. and B. Consider a simple case:
C. sells to X. "all his right, title and interest" in the firm.
What is the legal situation? The firm is dissolved. C.
having sold out his interest has no further standing 7 in re-
spect to the firm property. But says Sharswood, 8s C.'s
rights are not extinguished. He still remains liable in-
definitely for the firm debts. Therefore his liability re-
maining his equity remains and all X. gets is a right to the
balance which would have been .due C. on an accounting
among the partners. The reason however, it is submitted,
is not because of C.'s merit, but because the rights of the
other partners are conserved by their equities. Apparently
this preservation of the equities of the remaining partners
""Among partners clear equities subsist, amounting to something
like a lien. 'They have equities to discharge each of them from liability
and then to divide the surplus according to their properties; or if there
is a deficiency to call upon each other to make up that deficiency accord-
ing to th eir properties." Lord Eldon, ex parte Williamsi II Ves. p. 3
(i8o5). Cited with approval by Lords Cairns, Hatherly and O'Hagan
in Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 Ap. Cas. pp. 517, 521 and 536 (i879); Story,
Partnership, 7th ed., p. 556, note 2.
"Howe v. Lawrence, 9 Cush. 553 to 558 (852).
"Story, P. S., 7th ed., § 361, p. 557; Bates, P. S., vol. i, § 549, CoM.
Bank.v. Wilkins, 9 Me. 38 (1832); Lindley, P. S., 6th ed., p. 343.
nIi Ves., p. 3 (18o5). See Story, P. S., § 358.
'Ex. p. Fell, io Ves. jr. 347 (iSoS); Vosper v. Krames, 3 N. J. Eq.
42o (1879); lones v. Fletcher, 4:2 Ark. at p. 449 (1883); Bivens v.
Croone, 2 Head (Tenn.), 339 (1859) ; Howe v. Lawrence, 9 Cush. 553 to
558 (1852) ; Rogers v. Nichols, 2o Tex. 719, 724 (I858) ; Bates, P. S.,
vol. i, § 550.
.I - - ouoted by James Parsons, P. S., 2d ed
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was not so at the ancient common law as we have seen.
8 9
Moreover the liability theory depends upon the deeper reason
that if the firm debts be not paid out of the firm assets C.
will be damaged in his own estate. But C. has already re-
ceived an indemnity againt loss in this particular.40 It is
not for him to say if it turn out that he will actually lose by
the transaction that he has not been indemnified enough. He
has made the bargain and must stand by it.41 But says
James Parsons,4 "'the (partner's) equity [i. e., that portion
of it which compels the application of the firm assets to the
payment of the firm debts]. . is not a vendable com-
modity. No one is interested in buying exemption from a
liability to which he is not exposed." Certainly not, but may
not a man having a claim release it? That is, in effect, what
the retiring partner does. He does not sell it, if you like, but
he releases it and it is gone as to him.
-As to the joint creditors, they may still work out their
priority at any event through A.'s and B.'s equities. There
seems, however, to be in the minds of some judges a very
different way of looking at the situation. In such a case43
as the one under consideration, it was held per Sharswood,
J., that the joint creditors could indeed have preference-
not through A.'s or B.'s rights, but through C.'s right which
in the mind of the judge was inextinguishable! It is sub-
mitted that the result reached by the decision was right,-
though for a wrong reason.
And so by a parity of reasoning the joint creditor's
priority will be conserved as long as any two of the original
partners remain in the firm or as long as one partner remains
if there be a separate vendee of the retired partner's interest
also. Obviously the vendee is subrogated to the retired
partner so far forth44 and the equities as between the vendee
'Pope v. Haman, Comberbach, p. 217 (1694).
See cases cited T. Parsons, P. S., p. 332, note.
See Story, P. S., § 359 and authorities in note i.
"1 James Parsons, P. S., pp. 457-58, 2d ed..
'Brenton v. Thompson, 2o L. I., p. 133 (1863), Dist. Court Philadel-
phia. Accord, Hobbs v. Wilson, I W. Va. 5o (1865), where, however,
the preference was put on the basis of an implied promise (I) by the
remaining partners to pay firm debts.
"An assignee, vendee or mortgagee of the retiring partner's interest
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and the remaining partier still exist.45 What Gibson, C. J.,
calls "The curious question . .' . whether separate pur-
chasers of the shares respectively would stand in the relation.
of partners, so as to enable the joint creditors to follow the
goods,"46 will be considered later.
It has been suggested, however, that where a partner sells
out his interest to two or more remaining partners, what
takes place is that the first firm sells out its property to the
second firm. 4T This it could do since the retiring partner
is so far agent of the first firm that he may pass a good
title to the firm property. If the transaction be really be-
tween two firms and bona fide, then the res of the first firm
is no longer subject as such to the lien of the creditors of the
first firm. While this is a perfectly possible legal way of
looking at the matter, it is submitted that it is highly arti-
ficial. The only difference it makes in the rights of all the
parties is to exclude the creditors of the first firm and prefer
those of the second. The fallacy, however, in this reasoning
appears when we consider the status of the partnership after
the withdrawal of a member. Either the partnership is dis-
solved or it is not. If it be dissolved the equities of the re-
maining partners spring into being instantly and through
them the firm creditors can claim priority. Obviously there
can be no settlement of the partnership affairs until the firm
creditors have been notified of the partner's withdrawal and
have had a reasonable time to prove their claims.48 The
can of his own right maintain a bill for an accounting against the other
partners. Nichol v. Stewart, 36 Ark. 612 (i88o); Miller v. Brigham, 5C
Cal., p. 615 (1875); Fellows v. Greenleaf, 43 N. H. 42I (1862) ; Mars
v. Goodenough, i6 Ore., 26 S. C., 16 Pdc. 918 (1887); Stimess v. Pierce
13 R. L 452 (z88i); Driggs v. Morely, 2 Pinn. (Wis.) 403, S. C. 2
Chand. 59 (85o) ; Donaldson v. Bank of Cape Fear, i Dev. Eq. (N. C.)
io3, 18 Am. Dec. 577 (x827); 4th Natl. Bank v. Carrolton R. R .Co.,
ii Wall. 624 (I87O); Redmayne v. Forster, L. I 2 Eq. 467 (i866);
Fawcett v. Whitehouse, i R. & M. 132 (1829).
" :'The purchaser would get merely the legal estate of the individual
debtor in the particular goods sold, subject to the rights of the other
partners and creditors of the firm," per Peters, J., Fogg v. Lazvry, 68
Me. 78 (1878). The italics are mine. See also Atkins v. Saxton, 77
N. Y. 195 to I99 (I879).
'5Doner v. Siauffer, i P. & W. (Pa.) p. I98 (1829).
'5Cf. Story, P. S., 7th ed., chap. xv, pp. 551-52.
-n-- . -- T ;n Birks v. Fr-nch. 21 Kan. 2.38 to 242 (1878).
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only way in which the firm creditors can instantly lose their
priority is that indicated below, where all the partners sell
out or where one partner purchases the interests of all the
others. If the firm be not dissolved, then the transfer is
only a form of words and- the firm creditors will still retain
priority over all other creditors in caseof a bankruptcy of the
firm.
It must be admitted, however, that the distinction con-
tended for in the text, that whether, when a partner sells out
to remaining partners, the priority of the creditors of the
original firm over the creditors of "the new firm"-to use
a convenient form of expression-will be allowed or not, is
dependent on what Lord Eldon calls "effluxion of time," is
not distinctly made, so far as we are aware, in any of the
-cases. The cases are decided flatly one way or another, that
the priority of the creditors of the old firm are to be pre-
ferred or not.- The numerical weight of authority inclines
to the latter view. But.it is submitted that were the point
to be-established,'it would make a convenient touchstone for
the solution of this vexatious question. It seems obviously
-unjust to spirit away the res from the creditors of the orig-
inal firm without their having any chance (as they have
-when their rights are likely to be lost on sale of all the part-
ners' interests at the instance of separate creditors) to get
'hold of them. On the other hand it must be said that from
a "business" point of view it is probably desirable to permit
the "new" firm to deal with the res as being unencumbered
by anything in the nature of a lien. It is not clear from
.-Lord Eldon's opinions how far the flight of time enters into
'his decisions in ex p. Ruffin and ex. p. Williams. In both
-those cases more than a year from dissolution had elapsed
before the contest between the two sets of creditors arose.
It seems likely then that the first set of crditors may have
been taken to have given up their priority on the partnership
property in specie and to have looked-if they may be
thought to have anticipated loss-to the separate estate of
-the partners. In this light nice questions would of course
arise as to the same creditors of both firms, i. e., those who
-had dealt with the first firm and who had continued to deal
with the second "firm" as if there had been no change. It
-is believed that the logical view is the one indicated above.
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Under any circumstances, where two or more partners re-
main, the separate creditors would come in last of all, since
even as to the first set of firm creditors the equities of the re-
maining partners would operate to preserve the property
for the latter.
Perhaps, since on the firm to firm hypothesis the proceeds
of the sale inwst belong to the original firm subject to distri-
bution among the original partners, the joint creditors would
still have their "quasi-lien" on the proceeds. As a matter
of fact the proceeds never do belong in such a case to the old
firm. They go, and it is understood by all parties to be the
fact that they go, to the retiring partner. Consequently ii
has been held that such a transfer is void as to the creditor
of the first firm. 49 The court said in effect they would lool
to the real nature of the transaction and would not alloy
a mere form of words to do injustice to the creditors of th(
first firm. It is submitted that the transaction even if bonc
fide might well be in despite of the statute 13 Eliz., Char
V,50 though nevertheless regarded as a sale by one firm t,
another.
So far the working of the general theory here propounde(
is comparatively simple. We have seen that a partner',
equity is either dependent upon his interest in the business oi
upon his unlimited liability. In either case it vanishes as to
him on a sale by him of his interest, since in the first case his
interest is all gone and in the second case he must be taken
to have released his claim because he is indemnified so as tc
cut the reason from beneath his equity. This is tacitly
recognized to be the case by conveyancers who, in negotiat-
ing a sale of a partner's interest'to the remaining partner or
partners, frequently require a bond of indemnity to save the
retiring partner harmless from the firm debts.51 The retiring
"Franklin Sugar Ref. Co. v. Henderson, 86 Md. 452 (897).
"'."Be it therefore declared . . . that all and every . . . grant,
alienation . . . of lands . . . goods and chattels . . . shall
be from henceforth deemed and taken (only as against that person or
persons . . . whose actions, suits, debts . . . are, shall or might
be in any wise disturbed, hindered, delayed or defrauded) to be clearly
and utterly void. . . ." Repealed in England, 1865, but in force in
Pa. in i8o8. See report of Justices, Roberts' Dig. Brit. Stats.
Ex p. Ruffln, 6 Ves., p. i19 (18oi) ; Wilson v. Soper, 13 B. Mon.
(Ky.) at p. 414 (1852); Lindley, P. S., 6th ed., p. 34.5.
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partner's equity being gone the joint creditor cannot hope
to work out his priority through it. If he retain his prefer-
ence it is only because another partner, not uniting in himself
the entire right to the firm property, remains. As tending
to show the soundness of -the general conclusions here ad-
vanced it may be remarked in passing that it has been held
52
that where there is a "partnership by estoppel," the fact that
only one of the associates was an owner of the business wil
prevent any preference in favor of the creditors of the sup-
posed partnership. Likewise, where by reason of a com-
munity of goods no account could be taken, since under the
agreement each member could take all he wanted, it was held
there being no equity in either partner no derivative right
of firm creditors could be said to exist.
52 a
Thus far, it is .believed there has been no rational criti-
cism of the actual results obtained from the operation of the
theory which forms the subject of our.thesis.
Consider now the case of a single partner remaining with
the entire firm property vested in him.5 3 -A., B. and C. are
partners. A. and B. sell out "all their right, title and inter-
est" to C. The retiring partners having lost their equities
the joint ceditor's priority is lost with them. What was
once the firm property is now the separate property of C.;
that is to say the right in rem against the corpus, even if it
may be said to exist as a metaphysical abstraction, is no
longer available to the joint creditors since the personal right
to enforce it is lost to the partners. C., therefore, is abso-
lute owner and free to alienate the property in any honest
way. An interesting speculation arises here whether in view
of the fact that C. is still liable for all the firm debts he may
not be said to have a lien on the corpus himself and conse-
quently the joint creditors to have their "quasi-lien." In ad-
dition to the legal impossibility of a man having a claim as a
York Co. Banks' Ap., 32 Pa. 446 (1859); Bi'er v. Kresge, 169 Pa.
405 (i895).
'a Rice v. Barnard, 20 Vt 479. (1848).
'Ex p. Ruffin, 6 Ves. rig (i8oi); Wilson v. Soper, 13 B. Mon. (Ky.)
at p. 414 (1852); Geombel v. Arnett, ioo II. 34 (i88i); Trentman v.
Swartzell, 85 Ind. 443 (1882); Bullitt v. Chartered Fund, 26 Pa. io8
(1856).
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partner against himself individually,54 the argument used be-
fore becomes pertinent. Namely, that when the only re-
maining partner sells what was the firm property he is in-
demnified as to his still remaining liability. However, if
the joint creditors be diligent and proceed at once against C.
they can attach the res in his hands and get execution on it
and satisfaction of their entire demand.
Consider now the only other possible case 5 in which the
partner's equity and with it the derivative priority of the
joint creditors can be lost. This occurs when the interests
of all the partners are alienated and it may happen' (a) when
the firm alone is solvent, or (b). when some of the partners
are insolvent and the firm is solvent, or (c) when some of the
partners are insolvent and the firm is insolvent, or (d) when
both partners and firm are solvent.
(a) Take the first case. The interests of A., B. and C.
are sold out by the sheriff on judgments by separate credi-
tors. We have seen that in C. J. Holt's time the vendees
became tenants in common. What becomes of the
"equities?" By our hypothesis they betome extinguished,
since the personal rights upon which they were dependent
are lost. This, it is believed, is and has been the'common
law for more than two centuries. The joint creditors have
lost their preference and consequently the separate creditors
who have been more diligent in getting judgment and execu-
Falkner v, Lowe, 2 Ex. 595 (1848) ; Gorham's Admir. v. Meacha'.s
Admr., 63 Vt, 231 (1891); Eastman v. Wright, 6 Pick. (Mass.) 36
(1828).
The case of joint creditors of the partners being able, by virtue of
the doctrine here indicated, to retaii, priority over ceitain other joint
creditors of.the business of the partners where a prior execution has
been issued by the former, is really no exception to the rule. Hall v.
Richardson (N. H.) 2o Ati. 978 (i8o); Saunders v. Reilly, 105 N. Y.
12, s. c. 12 N. E. 170 (1887); Davis v. D. & H. Canal Co., iog N. Y.
47 s. c. 15 N. E. 873 (1888) ; (semble) Snodgrass Ap. 13 Pa. 471 (185o) ;
(sbmble) Hoare v. Bank, 2 Ap. Cas. 5k (I77). Same effect Couch-
man v. Maupin, 78 Ky. 33 (1879) ; CGts. Bank v. Williams, 128 N. Y. 77,
s. c. 28 N. E. 33 (i8gi); contra, Bank v. Mitchell, 58 Cal. 4" (i88).
What happens is that among several creditors of the partnership the
one getting pijor execution retains the first lien on res. The result is
attained thus: the doctrine of firm creditors' priority is for the benefit
of a solvent partner. But where there is a contest'between rA,+A: . r
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tion take the proceeds5 6  Nor as between the vendees-at
sheriff's sale and the joint creditors are the latter in any bet-
ter position. It cannot be said that they had a lien on the
firm property, since in that event no firm could ever give a
clear title to a vendee of its property as long as there were
creditors of the firm. The result is that, because the part-
ners are bankrupt the firm creditors can recover only what
may be had in a scramble for the separate estates of the part-
ners. This is the rule in the United States courts,57 in
Pennsylvania,5" in Alabama,59 in Arkansas, 60 in Illinois,6
1
in Indiana, 62 in Maryland, 63 in Tennessee,64 in Kentucky, 65
the partners as joint obligors and creditors of the partners in respect
to firm transactions the reason for the doctrine fails. That is, since
the solvent partner is no worse off by reason of the diversion of the res
from the payment of- the partnership debts as such, to the payment of
the joint obligation, the priority of the creditor of the firm business will
not be allowed. This seems proper, since it is possible for a man to be
a partner in more than one enterprise at the 'ame time. Consequently
where he is associated with the same partner or partners in several
distinct ventures the real state of affairs is that the original partnership
has been enlarged to include the new venture. Then what happens
when a joint obligee gets execution on firm property is that one part-
nership creditor has secured precedence over another. Ordinarily he
will not be disturbed. Very probably, however, this rule would be
controlled in bankruptcy. See Bates, P. S., vol. ii § 829, where the
subject is regarded from another point of view, but with a similar
result.
If on the other hand the joint obligation be regarded as the several
obligation of each partner, it would follow as in the case of Coover's
Appeal that the entire right of each individually having been sold out
the derivative right of the firm creditor would also be lost.
"Doner v. Stauffer, i P. & W. I98 (1829) ; Coover's Ap. 29 Pa., p. 9
(857).
"' Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. ix9 (1878) ; Huiskamp v. Wagon Co.,
121 U. S., p. 324 (1886).
" Coover'S Ap. 29 Pa., p. 9 (857).
" Goldsmith v. Eichold, 94 Ala. i6 (i8gi).
'Jones v. Fletcher, 42 Ark., p. 450 (1883).
" Goembel v. Arnett, Ioo Ill., p. Z1 (1881).
Trentman v. Swartzell, 85 Ind. 443 (1882).
Griffith v. Birck, 13 Md. 102 and pp. 114-15 (i858).
"Croone v. Bivens, 2 Head, 339 (i859).
lWilson v. Sope?, 13 B. Mon. at p. 414 (1852).
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and in England.66  It is observed, however, that even in so
unusual a case as that above the joint creditors are no worse
off than the separate creditor. Had the-former gotten in
their execution first they would have had priority.
67
"The68 injustice, and it may be said the absurdities, which
result from such a view, lead to an inquiry into its correct-
ness. A firm may be perfectly solvent though the members
are individually insolvent, yet in such- a case the doctrine
that the property of the firm is diverted and the equities of
the partners and partnership creditors are extinguished, by
separate transfers of the individual interests of all the part-
ners' might result not only in an appropriation of all the
properties of the firm to the payment of the individual debts,
to the entire exclusion of the firm creditors, but to a most
unjustifiable sacrifice and waste of such properties. For ex-
ample, suppose a firm to consist of three members, each hav-
ing an equal interest and to be possessed of assets to the
amount of $3ooooo, and to owe debts to half that amount,
the interest of each partner, supposing their accounts be-
tween (sic) themselves to be even, is $5oooo. The mem-
bers of the firm are individually indebted. One of them
sells his share and receives for it $5o,ooo, which is its actual
value. The share of another of the partners is sold out
under execution and brings its full value $5o,00. Thus
far one partner remains and he has an equity to have the firm
debts paid. . . The purchasers of the separate interests
are entitled to the surplus only; the joint creditors still have
their recourse against the partnership property and the
right to levy on such of it as is subject to sale on execution.
But before any levy the remaining partner sells out his indi-
vidual interest, or it is sold out on execution. According
to the doctrine applied in the present case'and maintained in
the case of Coover's Appeal (supra) the firm property is, by
UEx p. Ruffln, 6 Ves. rig (i8oi). Contra Menagh v. Whitwell, 52
N. Y., p. 156 (1873), and Ross v. Henderson, 77 N. C. i7o (1877). But
the authority of this first case must be considered as impaired since
the decision of Davis v. D. & H. Canal Co., iog N. Y. 47, S. C. 15 N. E.
873 (1888).
Ex p. Williams, ii Ves. 3 (I8O5).
Per Rapallo, J., Menagh v. Whitwell, supra.
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this last sale, relieved from the partnership debts; the two
shares first sold are at once changed from interests in the
surplus to shares in the corpus of the property, free from the
debts, their value is doubled and the fund which should have
gone to pay the joint debts is without any consideration (?)
appropriated by the transferees of the individual interests of
partners." ,
This last objection as to the wasting of the patners' estate
seems hardly to go to the root of the matter. 'By the very
hypothesis the partners are individually bankrupt and as to
the $50,000 they might have diverted to the payment of firm
debts they are no worse off than before. A man who is
bankrupt is not damaged by having an additional $50,000 of
debts thrown upon him, since he can always take advantage
of the bankrupt law and become discharged. In any event he
can have an accounting before sale on execution."9 By so
doing the only thing to be sold will be the ascertained share
of the partner against whom executicin is issued. This is a
very different thing from selling "all his right, title and
interest," as in the case put. As has been pointed out the
tangle into which the law on this subject has gotten is due
to the fact that at common law a partner's unascertained
interest might be seized and sold. It is unfortunate that this
relic has survived.
(b) Considering now the second case where the firm is
solvent and one or more of the partners is solvent. The
solvent partner sells out and the interests of the remaining
partners are sold out. As to the joint creditors the result is
as before. But how about the "unjustifiable sacrifice" of the
solvent partner's interest ? He it is true is damaged by be-
coming liable for the entire firm debt. That being so can
he protect himself? Clearly he can by demanding an ac-
counting in the first place instead of selling out. It may be
that he is in instant need of the money. He can, of course,
mortgage his interest. If he does sell it and subsequently
loses by the transaction as in the case put, how does the mat-
ter stand? He has simply sacrificed his property for the
Nixon v. Nash, 12 0. State, 647, at p. 65i (i86i) ; Hubbard v. Curtis,
8 Ia. 14 (1859). •
FIRM CREDITORS' PRIORITY
sake of ready cash-a 'thing which happens every day in
business; and against which the law cannot relieve
(e) The third case is where some of the partners are sol-
vent and the firm is insolvent. It is conceived that this case
is much the same as the foregoing. There is indeed no more
reason for seeking to preserve the solvent partner's equity,
since he will be liable'to some degree in any event. The
joint creditor moreover is not quite so badly off.
(d) The last case-where the partners and the firm are
solvent-is comparatively simple and has already been inci-
dentally discussed. Obviously the loss of the joint creditor's
priority is no hardship to him, since he can always get full
satisfaction from the partners..
Consider now in the above four cases the position of the
vendee of the partner's "right, title and interest." Since the
common law permitted the sale of a partner's unascer-
tained share the vendee is in any event buying what James
Parsons70 picturesquely calls "a pig in a poke." Whether the
fact that "the pig"-to carry out the figure-may double
i. size over-night is a drawback to the propriety of the sale
is not at all obvious.71 It might very well redound to the
advantage of the partner whose share was sold, since the
prospect of a purchase becoming more valuable might en-
courage a vendee to pay a higher price than otherwise.
The body of principles described above is, if not ideally
perfect, nevertheless of great practical value.-In the last
analysis, .therefore, it is seen that the only difficulty found
by its critics with Lord Eldon's theory is that it denies the
firm creditor priority-NOT an equal chance with the sepa-
rate creditors-only when all the partners' interests have
been sold or where one partner has bought all the others'
interests. This, it is to be observed, is important only in
case of the insolvency of the partners themselves. It is
hinted in some of the cases that the above results would give
oppbrtunity for fraud in disposing of the partnership assets.
But if fraud were committed, the whole transaction could be
set aside. The fact that fraud might be committed -is no
"James Parsons, Principles of Partnership, Ist ed., p. 288.
'See Story, P. S., 7th ed. 261, p. 405.
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reason at all. No system of jurisprudence will ever be de-
vised which will eliminate all possibility of fraud. As to
another matter-the power to prefer creditors under cloak
of the doctrine here enounced-it must be borne in mind
that until the passage of the National Bankruptcy Act prefer-
ences were allowed in the great .majority of the United
States, as they now are in England.
To sum up then the objections to what Theophilus Par-
sons 2 calls "Lord Eldon's theory of the quasi-lien of the firm
creditors," we find that in two unusual cases the joint credi-
tor is deprived of his priority. We are by no means sure
that this is an undesirable result. As C. J. Gibson says, 73
"a preference in favor of joint creditors (is) founded on no
merits of their own." Non constat that it is to be to the
public advantage .to have the joint creditors preferred in any
case. However, they can always protect themselves by
getting in an execution first.
It hbs been shown that the only other possible theory-
short of a mere rile of thumb, that joint creditors are to be
preferred in all cases-on which firm creditors are to have
priority, is absolutely untenable and would bring about con-
fusion worse confounded than that it seeks to avoid.
CONCLUSION.
One last word, assuming that the statement of the common
law given above is correct, in reference to the significance of
the historical growth and logical application of the doctrine
as a whole.
While it may very well be that if we were preparing a
brand new code we would provide that firm creditors should
have as against separate creditors a lien upon partnership
property, it is difficult to see why this should be done, as
they seem adequately protected under the existing law. True
it is that if they sleep on their claims they may in two in-
stances lose their priority. But though it may be trouble-
some they may in those'cases secure themselves.
In short, it seems that after much travail the courts have
" T. Parsons, P. S., 4th ed., p. 331, note.
"Doner v. Stauffer, i P. & W. (Pa.) 198 (1829).
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brought forth in response to a demand by the community a
doctrine, perhaps not "without speck or blemish," but which
answers its purpose without deranging the rest of the law of
partnership.
The growth of the principles here discussed seems a most
instructive example of the manner in which the common
law is moulded and shows with what ingenuity courts will
labor toward a desired end.
Edmund Bayly Seymour, Jr.
